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Abstract 
The ageing of populations and hampering economic growth increase pressure on public fi-
nances in many advanced capitalist societies. Consequently, governments have adopted pen-
sion reforms in order to relieve pressure on public finances. These reforms have contributed 
to a relative shift from public to private pension schemes. Since private social security plans 
are generally less redistributive than public social security, it can be hypothesized that the 
privatization of pension plans has led to higher levels of income inequality among the elderly. 
Existing empirical literature has mainly focused on cross-country comparisons at one moment 
in time or on time-series for a single country. This study contributes to the income inequality 
and pension literature by empirically analysing the distributional effects of shifts from public 
to private pension provision in 15 European countries for the period 1995-2007, using pooled 
time series cross-section regression analyses. Remarkably, we do not find empirical evidence 
that shifts from public to private pension provision lead to higher levels of income inequality 
or poverty among elderly people. The results appear to be robust for a wide range of econo-
metric specifications.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The ageing of populations has triggered pension reform in many industrialized countries over 
the past decades. Plans to alleviate the pressure of ageing on public finances have resulted in 
a trend towards more private pension provision (OECD, 2009; Orenstein, 2011). In the pen-
sion literature, remarkably little attention has been paid to the distributive effects of these 
reforms for the elderly. Since private social security arrangements generally entail less in-
come redistribution than public social security (Goudswaard and Caminada, 2010), it could be 
expected that shifts from public to private in the pension provision lead to higher levels of 
income inequality and poverty among elderly people (Arza, 2008). This would imply a trade-
off between alleviating the pressure on public finances on the one hand and income inequality 
among the elderly on the other. The empirical literature in this field exists mainly of either 
cross-national studies at one moment in time (for example Smeeding and Williamson, 2001) 
or descriptive analyses for a single country (for example Milligan, 2008). As a consequence, 
relatively little insight has been gained about how pension reforms have influenced income 
inequality and poverty among the elderly in advanced capitalist countries over the past dec-
ades. 
The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between the developments in pension 
systems and the variation in income inequality and poverty among the elderly across coun-
tries and over time. First, we will analyze to what extent reforms have resulted in a trend 
towards relatively more private pension provision across advanced capitalist countries. To that 
end we use the most recent release of the OECD Social Expenditure database (2010). Indeed, 
in the pension systems of many countries there have been shifts from public to private in the 
period 1995-2007, but there is substantial variation across countries. Subsequently, it will be 
examined to what extent these shifts have influenced income inequality levels and poverty 
rates among the elderly, based on a number of pooled time series cross-section regression 
analyses. Our focus on annual macro data for a relatively short period implies that this paper 
does not contain an integral income redistribution analysis based on the discounted values of 
lifetime income, contributions paid and benefits received. The main result of our analysis is 
that a relatively higher private share of pension provision in a country is not associated with 
higher levels of income inequality or poverty in that country. With respect to inequality and 
poverty, the analysis mainly relies on EU ECHP/SILC data (Eurostat, 2011a), but the results 
appear to be robust for other data and for a wide range of econometric specifications. 
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the relationship between pension reform and 
income inequality among elderly people is introduced. Section 3 describes the data, measures 
and method used in this study. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics, the results of the 
regression analyses and the sensitivity analyses. In section 5 some explanations for our find-
ings will be discussed and the paper closes with the conclusions in section 6.  
 
 
2. Pension reforms 
 
2.1 Public and private pensions 
In an era of ageing populations, relieving public finances is one of the most important drivers 
of pension reform. An increase in the number of pensioners relative to the labour force leads 
to increasing budgetary pressure. Budgetary problems as a consequence of cyclical shocks, 
such as the recession of 2008-2009, may increase the pressure to reform (public) pension 
systems even further. However, even though the pressure to reform pensions is high, pension 
reforms are in reality often unruly. Since pensions are based on long-term contracts, reforms 
are complicated by institutional path dependency (Myles and Pierson, 2001). Changes as 
higher statutory pension ages or reductions of pension benefits are often controversial from a 
political viewpoint and therefore difficult to realize. Hence, many countries have chosen for a 
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different approach to pension reform. This approach, which is often labeled ‘pension privatiza-
tion’, entails shifts from public pension provision to a mix of public and private pension provi-
sions and a change from the defined benefit to the defined contribution system (OECD, 2009; 
Orenstein, 2011).
1
 In Germany, for instance, the 2001 pension reform consisted of a reduc-
tion of the public pension levels and the introduction of state-subsidized, voluntary private 
pension schemes (Natali and Rhodes, 2008). Based on a comparative case study, Arza (2008) 
shows that this is the type of pension reform that has also been opted for in Italy, Sweden, 
Poland and the United Kingdom.  
The relevant question here is how relative shifts in the pension provision would affect the in-
come distribution among elderly people. Public pension plans are generally based on income-
related funding and flat rate benefits, which relatively strongly benefit lower income groups. 
Therefore, public pensions are expected to generate a more equal income distribution and 
less poverty among the elderly. In a number of OECD countries, the level of public pension 
benefits is such that a relatively small percentage of pensioners falls below the poverty line. 
Private pension plans, in contrast, are based on a link between contributions paid and benefits 
received and therefore are not expected to contain elements of (ex ante) income redistribu-
tion. A private pension insurance is actuarially fair as a rule. This means that each individual 
is provided with benefits whose actuarial value is equal to his contributions, given the chance 
of the insured event occurring. This is the case for individual private pension insurances that 
have a defined contribution character. However, private earnings-related pension schemes (in 
the second pillar) may not be actuarially fair and may contain elements of redistribution. This 
is often the case when (supplementary) private schemes are negotiated by social partners in 
collective labour contracts. These schemes are mandatory for (a group of) workers. Defined 
benefit pension schemes, for example, generally redistribute resources both within genera-
tions (for instance through redistributive elements such as thresholds or ceilings) and across 
generations (risk sharing, back service). Also, tax advantages (to households or to employ-
ers) can be used to stimulate the provision of private pensions. This is often the case in sup-
plementary pension programs, where contributions are tax exempt (Yoo and De Serres, 
2004). The fiscal advantages related to, for example, supplementary private pension plans 
are positively related to income levels in most countries and thus favor the rich (Goudswaard 
and Caminada, 2010). In general, as Ferrarini and Nelson (2003, pp. 14-15) showed, social 
insurance is less equalising after taxation in all countries.  
In summary, it seems plausible that private pension schemes will generate less income redis-
tribution from rich to poor than public programs, although at this stage their distributional 
impact in a cross-country analysis is not fully clear. In other words, there are good reasons to 
expect that relative shifts from public to private pensions lead to higher income inequality 
among the elderly.  
 
2.2 Earlier findings 
Much literature analyses the relationship between social security and income inequality in 
general. Based on a cross-national study at the macro level Smeeding and Williamson (2001) 
conclude that high levels of public social spending are associated with low levels of income 
inequality and poverty. Caminada and Goudswaard (2005) and Goudswaard and Caminada 
(2010) compare the redistributive effects of public and private social security. Taking a broad 
definition of social security and based on an international comparative analysis, they conclude 
that the redistributive effect of private social security is smaller than that of public social se-
curity. However, Caminada et al. (2011) find no significant effects of private social expendi-
ture on poverty rates. 
                                                 
1  A shift from public to private pension provision alleviates the pressure on public finances, but it does not 
solve financing problems of the pension system. If a deficit of the pension system is considered as unsus-
tainable, the only solution to make it sustainable is reducing benefits, increasing contributions, or both, ei-
ther publicly or privately (Barr and Diamond, 2009).  
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Interestingly, the findings for pensions seem to be less ambiguous than for social security in 
general. A number of cross-sectional studies indicate that income inequality among elderly 
people is lower as larger shares of the income of the elderly exist of public pension benefits 
(Brown and Prus, 2004; Weller, 2004; Fukawa, 2006). The number of studies on the income 
effects of private pensions is considerably smaller, but Schirle (2009) found for Canada that a 
larger private share in the pension provision is associated with an increasing income inequal-
ity among elderly people. Combining the results of the studies on public and private pensions, 
it seems plausible that a shift from public to private leads to more income inequality among 
the elderly. 
Comparable effects of shifts in the public/private-mix of pensions have been found for poverty 
among elderly people. Based on country-specific analyses over time, Oshio and Shimizutani 
(2005) and Milligan (2008) concluded that a larger public share in the pension provision is 
related to less poverty among elderly people. Hughes and Steward (2004) found that in-
creases in the private share are associated with an increase in the poverty rate among elderly 
people.   
From a methodological perspective, the empirical literature on pension reform and income 
inequality can be divided into two types of studies. The first type consists of cross-sectional 
studies, comparing a number of countries in a certain year (Brown and Prus, 2004; Weller, 
2004; Fukawa, 2006). In these studies, the effects of pension reform cannot be analysed over 
time. The second type of studies is mainly focused on developments over a longer period but, 
for a single country (Schirle, 2009; Milligan, 2008, Myles, 2000; Oshio and Shimizutani, 
2005). In these studies, it is quite difficult to examine whether the findings also hold for other 
comparable pension reforms in other countries. Therefore, in this study the dimension time 
will be incorporated into a cross-sectional analysis. 
 
 
3. Data, measures and method 
 
3.1 Public and private pension expenditure 
Most comparative studies on welfare states rely on social expenditures as indicator to analyse 
welfare state reforms across different countries. In order to examine changes in the pub-
lic/private-mix of pension provision, we use data from the most recent OECD Social Expendi-
ture Database (2010). This database contains social expenditure data on both public and pri-
vate pension schemes. In this database, programmes are classified as social when two condi-
tions are simultaneously satisfied (Adema and Ladaique, 2009; Adema, 2010). First, they 
have to be intended to serve a social purpose, such as old-age.
2
 Second, they have to involve 
either inter-personal redistribution or compulsory participation. Hence, purely private old-age 
plans which are the result of direct market transactions by individual people are not included.
3
 
The distinction between public and private social security is based on the institution that con-
trols the financial flows, namely public agencies or private bodies. 
Our study analyses public and private social pension expenditure, both expressed as percent-
age of GDP and as millions of U.S. dollars (constant (2000) prices, ppp) per pensioner. A rele-
vant measure is the share of private social pension expenditure as percentage of total social 
pension expenditure. This measure provides a good indication of shifts in the public/private-
mix. The measure for private social pension expenditure indicates the total of expenditures on 
mandatory and voluntary pension schemes.
4
 Furthermore, the indicators include expenditures 
                                                 
2  According to Adema and Ladaique (2009), other policy areas with a social purpose are: survivors, incapac-
ity related benefits, health, family, active labour market policies, unemployment, housing and a category of 
other social security areas. 
3  Neither are alternative old-age provisions such as home ownership included. 
4  The OECD Social Expenditure Database also provides the possibility to present expenditures on mandatory 
and voluntary private pension separately. However, since the classification of private pension spending into 
mandatory and voluntary pension schemes is not unequivocal, we mainly use the total of these two catego-
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on incomes of people who retired at the statutory retirement age and of early retirees.
5
 Ex-
penditures on survivor pensions are not included in the indicators.  
In a cross-national analysis at the macro-level, expenditure indicators have some limitations 
(Van Vliet, 2010). First, differences in expenditure patterns may be driven by differences in 
demographic trends across countries. When increases in pension expenditure fall short of in-
creases in the number of retirees, this may have negative consequences for the incomes of 
elderly people and for the income inequality among the elderly. To control for the ageing of 
populations, we include a control variable measuring the percentage of population aged 65 
and above.
6
 For this measure we use data from Eurostat (2011b). Second, expenditures do 
not indicate institutional differences in pension systems, such as a pay-as-you-go versus a 
funded system, or a defined benefit versus a defined contribution system. Third, the variation 
in the tax treatment of contributions and benefits across countries is not taken into account. 
Ideally, we would use net expenditure on pensions, after tax, but international standardized 
data for such an indicator are unfortunately not available for a longer period. Despite these 
limitations, pension expenditures can give an indication of shifts from public to private pen-
sions. 
 
3.2 Income inequality and poverty among the elderly 
For income inequality and poverty among the elderly, the study relies on two indicators pro-
vided by Eurostat (2011a). Income inequality among the elderly is measured by the S80/S20 
ratio of people aged 65 and over. This indicator is constructed by dividing the total disposable 
income of the top twenty percent incomes of elderly by the total equivalised disposable in-
come of the bottom twenty percent incomes of people aged 65 and over. A higher value of 
this indicator implies a higher inequality among the elderly. Although this indicator gives a 
good indication of income inequality at the extremes of the distribution, it neglects shifts be-
tween other quintiles. Therefore, the Gini-coefficient and the Atkinson index may be preferred 
measures of income inequality. However, data on income inequality among elderly measured 
by either the Gini coefficient or the Atkinson index are not available for a reasonable number 
of years.
7
 
Poverty among the elderly is measured by the percentage of people aged 65 and over who 
live below the poverty line of 60% of median equivalised (disposable) income of the total 
population. This poverty line of 60% is also officially used as poverty measure by the Euro-
pean Union. A higher value of this indicator implies a higher rate of poverty among elderly. 
Note that this indicator is a relative poverty line and can therefore be seen as a detailed rep-
resentation of income inequality for the lower part of the income distribution.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
ries. As a robustness check, we also analysed the income effects of mandatory and voluntary pension 
schemes separately, which did not alter the results (reported below). Note that the classification into pub-
lic, mandatory private and voluntary private pensions coincides with the classification into first, second and 
third pillar pensions respectively.  
5  Expenditures on public pensions also include spending on some other services for the elderly (see Vanden-
broucke and Vleminckx, 2011).   
6  Note that people aged 65 and over is used as a proxy for the number of pensioners. Although the age of 65 
is the statutory age of receiving pensions for men in most countries used in this analysis (except for Den-
mark (67 until 2002, after that 65), France (60), Ireland (66), Italy (respectively 60, 62, 64 until 2002, af-
ter that 65) and Norway (67), in reality the average age of retirement is lower than the statutory age in all 
described countries. Moreover, the statutory pension age may differ for women (ISSA, 2011). 
7  However, we employed a number of regressions with Gini-coefficients as robustness check. The results are 
discussed in Section 4.    
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3.3 Method 
To examine the relationship between pension reform and income inequality among the eld-
erly, we run a number of pooled time series cross-section regression analyses. Our estimat-
ions take the following form: 
 
ittiitwitwit ZXQ ελµδβα +++++= ,, ''        (1) 
 
In Equation 1, Q represents the dependent variables of income inequality (S80/S20) or pov-
erty (PL 60) among the elderly. Variables describing the pension system, public pension ex-
penditures, private pension expenditures and total pension expenditures (all as a percentage 
of GDP) and the private share of pension expenditures (private pension expenditures as per-
centage of total pension expenditures), are represented in X. The control variables ageing 
(share of people aged 65 and over relative to total population) and GDP per capita are repre-
sented in Z. For the latter variable we use data from the OECD (2011).
8
 Recognising that the 
variation in income inequality and poverty among the elderly may be related to unobserved 
country- and year-specific effects, country (i) and year (t) dummies are modeled by µ and λ, 
respectively. The error-term ε follows an AR(1)-process to correct for autocorrelation. In addi-
tion, we use panel-corrected standard errors to correct for panel-heteroskedasticity and si-
multaneous spatial correlation (Beck and Katz, 1995). 
Constrained by data availability, the study covers 15 European countries – Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom - for the years 1995 up till 2007. In the 
dataset, a number of observations is missing. This is in particular the case for the income 
inequality and poverty data and especially for Scandinavian countries. However, all countries 
are included in the regression analyses. Several sensitivity tests, which are discussed below, 
indicate that results do not suffer from the missing data. 
 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 illustrates the developments in pension expenditures for the included countries from 
1995 up till 2007. On average, social expenditures as a percentage of GDP on both public and 
private pensions have been increased. Hence, total pension expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP has increased too. Furthermore, the data show an increase in the private share of total 
pension expenditure, albeit to a limited extent. Private spending as a share of total pension 
expenditure rose on average from 14.3 percent in 1995 to 14.9 percent in 2007.
9
 This indi-
cates a relative shift from public to private in the pension provision. More interestingly, there 
is substantial variation in the developments of private pension expenditure as a share of total 
pension expenditure across countries. In Belgium for instance, social expenditures on private 
pensions increased more than expenditures on public pensions. This has resulted in a shift 
from public to private in the total pension expenditure.
10
 In other countries, such as Denmark, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, shifts in the public/private-mix are the 
result of opposing trends in public and private pension expenditure. Indeed, there is a nega-
tive correlation between yearly changes in private and public pension expenditure of -0.22 
which is significant at the 1 percent level.
11
 
                                                 
8  Real GDP per capita in constant (2000) prices ppp. 
9  This is an unweigted average of the countries 
10  This trend fits well with the trend that is reported in Peeters et al (2003), which is based on data from 
national sources.  
11  This in line with the partial substitution effect that has been found for total public and total private social 
expenditure (Van Vliet, 2011). 
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Table 1. Pension expenditures in European countries, 1995-2007 
 
 
Public pension expenditure 
as percentage of GDP 
 
 
Private pension expenditure 
as percentage of GDP 
 
 
Total pension expenditure as 
percentage of GDP  
 
 Private pension expenditure 
as percentage of total pen-
sion expenditure 
 
 1995 2007 
Change  
95-07 
 1995 2007 
Change 
95-07 
 
1995 2007 
Change 
95-07 
 
1995 2007 
Change 
95-07 
                
Austria 10.0 10.7 0.7  0.4 0.5 0.1  10.4 11.3 0.8  3.7 4.7 0.9 
Belgium 7.0 7.1 0.1  1.3 2.8 1.5  8.3 9.9 1.6  15.5 28.4 12.8 
Denmark 8.4 7.3 -1.1  1.8 2.2 0.3  10.2 9.5 -0.7  18.0 23.0 5.0 
Finland 8.5 8.4 -0.1  0.3 0.2 -0.1  8.8 8.6 -0.2  3.4 2.2 -1.1 
France 10.6 11.1 0.5  0.1 0.2 0.1  10.7 11.2 0.5  1.0 1.5 0.5 
Germany 8.0 8.7 0.7  0.7 0.7 0.1  8.6 9.4 0.8  7.6 7.9 0.3 
Greece 9.2 10.0 0.9  0.4 0.4 0.0  9.5 10.4 0.9  3.8 3.5 -0.3 
Ireland 2.9 3.1 0.2  1.1 0.9 -0.2  3.9 4.0 0.1  26.8 22.4 -4.4 
Italy 9.3 11.7 2.4  2.8 1.3 -1.5  12.2 13.1 0.9  23.4 10.1 -13.3 
Luxembourg 8.2 4.8 -3.4  0.6 0.3 -0.3  8.8 5.2 -3.7  6.8 6.6 -0.2 
Netherlands 5.5 5.3 -0.3  2.6 3.5 0.9  8.1 8.8 0.7  31.9 40.2 8.4 
Norway 7.1 6.2 -0.8  0.6 0.6 -0.1  7.7 6.8 -0.9  8.2 8.5 0.3 
Portugal 6.0 9.2 3.2  0.2 0.2 0.0  6.2 9.4 3.2  2.7 1.8 -0.8 
Sweden 9.8 9.0 -0.8  1.9 2.1 0.2  11.7 11.1 -0.7  16.3 19.0 2.7 
United Kingdom 5.5 5.8 0.3  4.7 4.5 -0.2  10.2 10.3 0.0  46.2 43.8 -2.5 
                
Mean 7.7 7.9 0.2  1.3 1.4 0.1  9.0 9.3 0.2  14.3 14.9 0.6 
 
Note: Figures for Luxembourg (1995) are based on linear extrapolation.   
Source:  OECD Social Expenditure Database (OECD, 2010) and own calculations.  
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Table 2 shows a general trend towards less income inequality and less poverty among the 
elderly in the period 1995-2007.
12
 In 2007, the average income inequality among elderly 
(mean 12 countries) has decreased by almost 18 percent compared to 1995. A decreasing 
trend over time is also shown by the poverty rate among the elderly which has decreased by 
almost 9 percent on average. There is some variation in trends between countries still. Greece 
and Portugal, for example, have shown a huge decline in poverty rates among elderly over 
time. However, Finland and Ireland have faced a relatively large increase in poverty among 
elderly in the same period. These trends are robust with respect to the poverty lines applied 
(50, 60 or 70 percent of median equivalised income). Nevertheless, different patterns of pov-
erty can be seen within countries. Germany and the Netherlands, for example, have shown a 
decrease in poverty rates among elderly when using poverty line of 50 percent while both 
countries have shown an increase in poverty rates in the same period when using a poverty 
line of 60 and 70 percent. These observations imply that relatively more elderly live at risk of 
poverty in 2007 compared to 1995, but less elderly find themselves at the absolute bottom of 
the income distribution.  
 
 
Table 2. Trends in social outcomes among elderly people, 1995-2007 
 
 
Income inequality among the  
elderly (S80/S20) 
 Poverty among the elderly (PL 60) 
 1995 2007 
Change 
95-07 
 1995 2007 
Change 
95-07 
        
Austria 4.0 3.2 -0.8  20.0 14.0 -6.0 
Belgium 4.9 3.4 -1.5  25.0 23.0 -2.0 
Denmark - 2.7 -  - 17.7 - 
Finland 3.0 2.9 -0.1  12.0 21.6 9.6 
France 4.8 4.0 -0.8  19.0 13.1 -5.9 
Germany 4.9 4.2 -0.7  15.0 16.2 1.2 
Greece 7.6 4.8 -2.8  35.0 22.9 -12.1 
Ireland 3.9 3.4 -0.5  19.0 28.3 9.3 
Italy 4.6 4.7 0.1  18.0 21.9 3.9 
Luxembourg 4.1 3.2 -0.9  12.0 7.2 -4.8 
Netherlands 4.2 3.2 -1.0  8.0 9.5 1.5 
Norway - 2.8 -  - 14.1 - 
Portugal 6.6 6.0 -0.6  38.0 25.5 -12.5 
Sweden - 2.8 -  - 9.9 - 
United Kingdom 4.9 4.4 -0.5  32.0 27.6 -4.4 
        
Mean (all countries) 4.8 3.7 -1.1  21.1 18.2 -2.9 
Mean (12 countries) 5.2 4.3 -0.9  23.0 21.0 -2.0 
 
Note: Mean 12 countries excluding Denmark, Norway and Sweden.   
Source:  Eurostat SILC-database (Eurostat, 2011a) and own calculations.  
 
                                                 
12
  These results should be interpreted with caution, because there is a disruption in the time series of inequal-
ity and poverty indicators presented in Table 2. Until 2001, data were provided by the European Commu-
nity Household Panel survey (ECHP). Since 2005 all EU-15 countries provide data from the new European 
Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). During the transitional period poverty indica-
tors were provided by national sources which were harmonized ex-post as closely as possible with EU-SILC 
definitions by Eurostat. Despite the fact that most EU-SILC variables are defined in the same way as the 
corresponding ECHP variables, some differences arise. The transition from ECHP to EU-SILC possibly ex-
plains the large number of missing observations in this period. See for
 
more details Eurostat (2005). 
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4.2 Regression results 
The social outcomes presented above suggest that there is no evidence that an increasing 
share of private pensions leads to higher income inequality and poverty among elderly. In 
Belgium for instance, the country with the largest relative shift from public to private, income 
inequality and poverty among the elderly decreased. In Italy, the country with the largest 
relative shift from private to public, an increase in income inequality and poverty rates among 
the elderly can be observed. In order to take our analysis beyond the descriptive statistics, we 
continue with regression analyses on the 15 European countries over the years 1995-2007.  
The results of the regression analyses are presented in Table 3A and Table 3B. The effects of 
public pension expenditure as percentage of GDP on income inequality among the elderly are 
negative, but not significant. Model 7 indicates that public pension expenditure as percentage 
of GDP is negatively and significantly related to poverty among the elderly. Consistent with 
our expectations based on the literature, this suggests that higher social spending on public 
pensions is associated with lower poverty rates among the elderly. However, the results in 
Models 9 and 11 indicate that there is only weak evidence for this relationship. 
With respect to private pension expenditure as percentage of GDP, the results do not indicate 
a positive effect of private pension expenditure on income inequality. In contrast, the nega-
tive coefficients suggest that private pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP is nega-
tively related to income inequality among the elderly. Model 2 indicates also a negative coeffi-
cient for private pension expenditure as percentage of total pension expenditure, but the 
Models 3 and 5 show a positive effect for the private share of the pension provision, albeit not 
significant. However, when pension expenditure is expressed in dollars per pensioner, to ex-
clude any denominator effect of GDP, the results indicate a negative effect for the private 
pension expenditure as a share of total pension expenditure again. This implies that higher 
spending on private pensions in general, and a shift from public to private pensions in particu-
lar, are not associated with higher income inequality among the elderly. Turning to poverty, 
all measures for private pension provision are not significantly related to poverty among the 
elderly.  
The results for total pension expenditure are comparable to the case of public pension expen-
ditures. Total pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP, which consists of the sum of pub-
lic and private pension expenditure, is negatively and significantly correlated with poverty 
among the elderly, while no significant correlation can be observed between total pension 
expenditures and income inequality among the elderly.  
As to graying populations, the results indicate that the effect of graying on income inequality 
and poverty among the elderly is limited. It seems that the percentage of the population aged 
65 and over is slightly negatively correlated with income inequality among the elderly, while 
no correlation can be observed between this variable and poverty among the elderly. The re-
sults suggest that there is no clear linkage between GDP per capita and income inequality 
among the elderly. However, GDP per capita is positively and significantly associated with 
poverty rates among the elderly. 
In concise, the results of the regression analyses suggest that higher private expenditure for 
pensions as a percentage of GDP, per pensioner and as a share of total pension expenditure 
are not associated with higher levels of income inequality among the population aged 65 and 
above. Furthermore, the regression analyses indicate a poor linkage between private provi-
sions of pension schemes and poverty rates among the elderly. Taken together, these results 
do not provide evidence for the expectation that shifts from public to private pension provi-
sion are associated with higher levels of income inequality.  
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Table 3A. Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and income inequality (s80/s20) among the elderly (65+) 
 
  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 -0.13  -0.07  -0.19  Public pension expenditures  
(% GDP)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.13)  
        
 -0.45***  -1.22**  -0.87**  Private pension expenditures 
(% GDP)  (0.17)  (0.52)  (0.42)  
        
  -3.41** 9.20  3.58 -6.82*** Private share (% total pension 
expenditures)   (1.52) (5.85)  (4.77) (2.52) 
        
    -0.20   Total pension expenditures  
(% GDP)     (0.13)   
        
      -0.01* Public pension expenditures per 
pensioner (/100)       (0.01) 
        
      -0.01 Private pension expenditures 
per pensioner (/100)       (0.01) 
        
 -0.22** -0.22* -0.26** -0.18 -0.34***  Population aged 65 and over 
(% total)  (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)  
        
GDP per capita (/1000)      -0.09*** 0.00 
      0.03 (0.03) 
        
Constant  8.96*** 7.62*** 8.99*** 9.03*** 13.74*** 7.12*** 
  (2.14) (1.78) (2.02) (2.23) (2.92) (1.12) 
        
Observations  135 135 135 135 135 135 
Adj. R-squared  0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.83 
Rho   0.41 0.42 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.39 
                
OLS regressions; unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; Prais-Winsten transformation (AR (1) disturbances). 
* Significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
Each regression also includes country and year dummies (not shown here). 
Countries included: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom.  
Data sources: Income inequality (Eurostat, 2011); Pension expenditure: OECD Social Expenditure Database (2010). 
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Table 3B. Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and poverty (PL 60) among the elderly (65+) 
 
  
  
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 -1.50*  -1.13  -0.29  Public pension expenditures  
(% GDP)  (0.83)  (0.91)  (1.14)  
        
 -1.09  -4.04  -5.23  Private pension expenditures 
(% GDP)  (0.82)  (3.31)  (3.84)  
        
  2.61 40.38  65.32 -0.95 Private share (% total pension 
expenditures)   (11.96) (48.43)  (56.73) (39.82) 
        
    -1.34*   Total pension expenditures  
(% GDP)     (0.70)   
        
      -0.11 Public pension expenditures per 
pensioner (/100)       (0.07) 
        
      -0.01 Private pension expenditures 
per pensioner (/100)       (0.15) 
        
 -0.54 -0.78 -0.70 -0.61 -0.02  Population aged 65 and over 
(% total)  (0.80) (0.76) (0.80) (0.78) (0.64)  
        
GDP per capita (/1000)      0.81** 1.08*** 
      (0.34) (0.30) 
        
Constant  42.75*** 30.42*** 41.05*** 42.37*** 1.38 12.50 
  11.58 (11.49) (11.46) (11.67) (16.85) (15.06) 
        
Observations  154 154 154 154 154 154 
Adj. R-squared  0.79 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.80 
Rho   0.63 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.59 
                
OLS regressions; unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; Prais-Winsten transformation (AR (1) disturbances). 
* Significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
Each regression also includes country and year dummies (not shown here). 
Countries included: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom.  
Data sources: Poverty (Eurostat, 2011); Pension expenditure: OECD Social Expenditure Database (2010). 
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4.3 Sensitivity analyses 
Since the results are not in line with our expectations based on both theoretical and empirical 
literature on pension reform and income inequality, we perform a variety of robustness 
checks. First, we examine the dependence of the results on different specifications of the em-
pirical model. Estimations without correction for autocorrelation or panel-corrected standard 
errors do not alter the result that shifts towards more private pensions are not correlated with 
higher income inequality or poverty levels among the elderly. With respect to the most impor-
tant independent variable, the share of private pension expenditure as percentage of total 
pension expenditure, it should be noted that the variation within countries over time is rather 
small. In combination with country fixed-effects, this reduces in itself the chance to find any 
significant effects for this variable. Therefore, we ran the analyses also without country fixed-
effects, which did not alter the results. In addition, we applied the Mundlak random effects 
specification
13
 (Mundlak, 1978) to correct for the small variation over time in the independent 
variable, showing that our results are robust (shown in Table A1 of the Annex). Other specifi-
cations that we applied, such as first differences, log-transformations, lagged variables or the 
exclusion of year fixed-effects did not change the results. Neither do the results change if an 
independent variable as graying is excluded (Table A2) or if a measure for a country’s wealth 
such as GDP per capita is included (Table A3).  
To further probe the robustness of our results, we take into account that our analyses are 
based on unbalanced panels owing to a number of missing observations. This is especially the 
case for Scandinavian countries with regard to the inequality and poverty indicators. This 
could lead to biased results, since Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have below aver-
age poverty and inequality levels. Therefore, we also ran regressions in which the number of 
observations is extended. Table A4 shows the regression results where both the dependent 
and the independent variables are linearly inter- and extrapolated. In Table A5 only the de-
pendent variables are linearly inter- and extrapolated. Since extrapolation is associated with 
more uncertainty than interpolation, we also show the regression results for only interpolated 
dependent variables in Table A6. Tables A7 and A8 show the regression results of interpolated 
data for dependent variables using more sophisticated techniques such as cubic- and cubic 
spline interpolation respectively.
14
 All tables show that our results are not biased by the miss-
ing observations. This is also confirmed by the results of regression analyses in which the 
group of Scandinavian countries is omitted (Table A9). These results are in line with the find-
ings of Gustafsson and Johansson (1999), who found that the group of Scandinavian countries 
do not influence the results of regression analyses on income inequality and social expendi-
ture very strongly. Moreover, the results are neither affected by excluding the countries one 
by one in the regression analyses (not reported). We also tested to what extent the results 
are driven by the countries with the largest shifts in the public/private-mix, namely Belgium, 
Italy and the Netherlands. Regressions without these three countries yielded similar results.   
Finally, we examine the sensitivity of the results for the use of alternative indicators and data 
sources. With regard to poverty, the results of estimation of poverty lines among the elderly 
of 50 and 70 percent are comparable with the results of the poverty line of 60 percent (Table 
A10). Subsequently, Table A11 presents our main empirical specification for four different 
indicators for income inequality among the elderly based on data from the OECD (2008).
15
 
                                                 
13  The empirical specification takes the form: ittiitwiwitwit ZXXQ ελµδφβα ++++++= ,,, ''' . Interpretation of the 
model is similar to equation (1) except that X  is the country-specific average of pension expenditure vari-
ables over time and ),0(~ 2σµ Ni .  
14  We use several inter- and extrapolation techniques such as linear inter- and extrapolation, cubic interpola-
tion and cubic spline interpolation. For applications of linear interpolation, see for example L’horty and 
Rault (2003), Clarke et al. (2008), Stern (2005) and Toroj (2008). An example of cubic spline interpolation 
in economics, which is based on polynomial instead of linear methods, can be found in Nanda and Ross 
(2008). 
15  The main advantage of these OECD data is the availability of more sophisticated income inequality indica-
tors. However, the most important disadvantage of these data is that at most 6 data points per country are 
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Our results with respect to the linkage between the share of private pension expenditure and 
income inequality among the elderly appear to be robust for Gini coefficients before and after 
taxes and transfers, the standard coefficient of variation and the mean log deviation. Addi-
tionally, the replication of the results presented in Table 3 with Gini coefficients
16
 and poverty 
lines
17
 among the elderly from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS, 2011) confirm our empiri-
cal results. As to the independent variable, the measures for private pension expenditure can 
be disaggregated into mandatory and voluntary private pension expenditure. The results of 
the regression analyses with the disaggregated measure do not differ from the results with 
the aggregated measures (Table A12). In summary, the combined evidence of these robust-
ness checks suggest that our results are robust with respect to different specifications, vari-
ables and data sources.  
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
A number of tentative explanations is conceivable for our main finding that shifts towards 
relatively more private pensions are not related to higher levels of income inequality among 
the elderly. The level of supplementary pension benefits is often strongly related to the in-
come level during working life. A more private pension provision therefore leads to a higher 
supplementary pension for higher incomes than for lower incomes. But it could be possible 
that even though the absolute increase in private pension benefits is smaller for lower in-
comes than for higher incomes, the relative increase for lower incomes is much larger than for 
higher incomes. This is illustrated by Myles (2002) in a study on pension reform in Canada in 
the beginning of the 1990s. Burtless (2006) also states that the effects of changes in the pub-
lic/private-mix of pensions on replacement rates - the income from pensions relative to in-
come from work in the past - vary along the income distribution. A possible scenario is that 
the coverage of private pensions has increased and that this is mainly the case for lower in-
come groups. This can be an explanation for the fact that we did not find a relationship be-
tween shifts in the public/private-mix of pensions and income inequality and poverty among 
the elderly. Hence, further research at the macro-level could be focused on specifying the 
effects of pension reform for different quintiles of the income distribution. 
In addition, it should be noted that the analyses in this study do not account for determinants 
of income at the individual level. On the one hand, this concerns general personal characteris-
tics which determine income such as education. On the other hand, current individual pension 
benefits are determined by long-term effects such as previous wages, contributions paid and 
macro-economic conditions in the past. It is hardly possible to capture this time dimension in 
a macro-level analysis. Another factor that might influence pension benefits and incomes of 
elderly people is the prevalence of deficiencies in contributions paid in the past (Esping-
Anderson and Myles, 2006). Future empirical research based on micro-data, in which it is 
possible to control for individual characteristics, may provide more insight into the relation-
ship between pension reform and income inequality. 
Finally, the use of pension expenditure data at the macro-level implies some restrictions. 
Much information can be lost in classifying pension programmes into pillars (Whitehouse, 
2002). Moreover, as mentioned above, shifts in pension expenditure can only give a rough 
indication of changes in institutional characteristics of pension systems. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
available in the waves from mid 1970s till mid 2000s. Another advantage is that these data are available 
for a longer period and a larger group of countries than the Eurostat (2011a) data. Our results also hold for 
this larger country group and longer period (see Table A11).   
16  The Gini coefficient among the elderly is provided by Wang and Caminada (2011) who constructed this 
indicator from the micro data. 
17  The 40, 50 and 60 percent poverty lines among the elderly are taken from the LIS Key Data (2011). 
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6. Conclusion 
 
In many industrialized countries, public pension systems have been reformed in order to alle-
viate the pressure on public finances resulting from ageing populations. This has often led to 
shifts in the pension provision from public to private. The average magnitude of these shifts 
remains limited, but in a number of countries there have been substantial changes. Since 
private pensions are probably less redistributive than public pensions, these shifts could be 
hypothesized to lead to more income inequality among retirees. This study contributes to the 
income inequality and pension literature by empirically analyzing the income effects of shifts 
in the public/private-mix of pensions in 15 European countries for the period 1995-2007, us-
ing pooled time series cross-section regression analyses. The most important finding is that 
shifts in the pension provision from public to private do not (yet) seem to entail higher levels 
of income inequality or poverty among people aged 65 and older. Intriguingly, this finding is 
not in line with expectations in the literature on pension reform and income inequality 
(Hughes and Stewart, 2004; Weller, 2004: Oshio and Shimizutani, 2005; Fukawa, 2006; 
Arza, 2008; Milligan, 2008) and with literature on the redistributive effects of public and pri-
vate social security in general (Caminada and Goudswaard, 2005; Goudswaard and Cami-
nada, 2010). A tentative explanation for this finding is that more people in lower income dec-
iles have been covered by private pension plans. As a result, the increases in the pension 
benefits of people with lower incomes were relatively larger than for people with higher in-
comes. 
The policy implication of our findings seems to be that the pressure of the pension expendi-
tures on public finances can be alleviated without serious consequences for income inequality 
or poverty among elderly people. However, this policy implication should be taken with much 
caution, even though the results are robust for other data sources and a broad range of alter-
native econometric specifications. As suggested before, our results could be explained by in-
creases in the coverage of private supplementary pension schemes rather than policy re-
forms. A higher coverage of private programs also causes a shift from public to private, but 
will probably have a rather different distributional impact compared to cutting public pension 
benefits. In addition, empirical research at the macro-level goes along with a number of limi-
tations with respect to institutional characteristics of pension systems and individual charac-
teristics of pensioners.  
Finally, it should be noted that our analysis does not include the years after 2007. This implies 
that we have no prospect of the income effects of the pension reforms which are triggered by 
the credit crisis at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The results of this study provide 
no reason to expect that recent reforms in many European countries will lead to more income 
inequality and higher poverty rates among the elderly. Future research should provide more 
insight into the answer to this question.  
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Annex: Sensitivity analyses 
 
Table 3 of the main text presents the results of panel data regressions of pension expendi-
tures and social outcomes among the elderly (65+). Tables A1 to A13 below present the re-
sult of several robustness checks: 
 
Table A1.  Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the 
elderly (65+) using Mundlak Random Effects 
Table A2.  Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the 
elderly (65+) excluding graying (population aged 65 and over, % total) 
Table A3.  Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the 
elderly (65+) including GDP per capita 
Table A4.  Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the 
elderly (65+) with linearly inter- and extrapolated dependent and independent 
variables 
Table A5.  Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the 
elderly (65+) with linearly inter- and extrapolated independent variables 
Table A6.  Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the 
elderly (65+) with linearly interpolated independent variables 
Table A7.  Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the 
elderly (65+) with cubically interpolated independent variables 
Table A8.  Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the 
elderly (65+) with cubically spline interpolated independent variables 
Table A9.  Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the 
elderly (65+) excluding Scandinavian countries 
Table A10.  Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and different poverty lines (PL 
50, PL 70) among the elderly (65+) 
Table A11.  Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and income inequality among 
the elderly (65+) using income distribution variables of OECD (2010) instead of 
Eurostat (2011) 
Table A12.  Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the 
elderly (65+) using a decomposition of private pension expenditures into man-
datory and voluntary expenditures 
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Table A1. Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the elderly (65+) using Mundlak Random Effects 
 
          
Income inequality (s80/s20) among the elderly (65+)  Poverty (PL 60) among the elderly (65+) 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  
  
             
 -0.08    -2.30**   Public pension expenditures (% 
GDP)  (0.17)    (1.09)   
         
 -0.46***    -1.68   Private pension expenditures 
(% GDP)  (0.14)    (1.13)   
         
  -3.67*    -6.02  Private share (% total pension 
expenditures)   (1.96)    (8.83)  
         
   -0.17    -2.32** Total pension expenditures (% 
GDP)    (0.19)    (1.05) 
         
 -0.15 -0.13 -0.13  -0.10 -0.56 -0.25 Population aged 65 and over 
(% total)  (0.20) (0.16) (0.20)  (1.23) (1.13) (1.17) 
         
Constant  5.13*** 6.54** 4.84***  25.23 28.06 25.08 
  (1.95) (2.81) (1.86)  (18.01) (18.72) (17.33) 
         
Country dummies  No No No  No No No 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) disturbances  No No No  No No No 
Observations   135 135 135  154 154 154 
R-squared: within  0.30 0.28 0.27  0.14 0.07 0.14 
Rho   0.74 0.82 0.78  0.83 0.82 0.86 
                  
 
OLS regressions; unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; Prais-Winsten transformation.  
* Significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.  
The country-specific averages of the pension variables are not reported. 
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Table A2. Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the elderly (65+) excluding graying 
 
          
Income inequality (s80/s20) among the elderly (65+)  Poverty (PL 60) among the elderly (65+) 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  
  
             
 -0.18      -1.63**   Public pension expenditures (% 
GDP)  (0.14)    (0.79)   
         
 -0.41**    -1.02   Private pension expenditures 
(% GDP)  (0.18)    (0.84)   
         
Private share (% total pension 
expenditures) 
 
 -2.99**    3.93  
   (1.25)    (11.05)  
         
   -0.23    -1.43** Total pension expenditures (% 
GDP)    (0.14)    (0.70) 
         
Population aged 65 and 
over (% total) 
 
       
         
Constant  6.25*** 4.37*** 34.23***  36.13*** 18.86*** 34.23*** 
  (1.48) (0.11) (7.50)  (8.24) (1.46) (7.50) 
         
Country dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) disturbances  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   135 135 135  154 154 154 
Adj. R-squared  0.84 0.83 0.84  0.79 0.78 0.79 
Rho   0.42 0.42 0.47  0.62 0.65 0.64 
                  
 
OLS regressions; unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; Prais-Winsten transformation.  
* Significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
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Table A3. Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the elderly (65+) including GDP per capita 
 
          
Income inequality (s80/s20) among the elderly (65+)  Poverty (PL 60) among the elderly (65+) 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  
  
             
 -0.22*    -0.94   Public pension expenditures (% 
GDP)  (0.12)    (1.01)   
         
 -0.58***    -0.50   Private pension expenditures 
(% GDP)  (0.18)    (0.97)   
         
         
  -4.39***    7.98  Private share (% total pension 
expenditures)   (1.51)    (14.05)  
         
   -0.28**    -0.78 Total pension expenditures (% 
GDP)    (0.14)    (0.87) 
         
GDP per capita (/1000)  -0.10*** -0.08** -0.08***  0.71** 0.81*** 0.70** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.36) (0.29) (0.36) 
         
Population aged 65 and over 
(% total)  -0.33*** -0.32** -0.27**  0.13 0.11 0.04 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)  (0.65) (0.64) (0.67) 
         
Constant  14.03*** 11.05*** 13.32***  9.03 -3.42 8.98 
  (2.95) (2.35) (3.06)  (16.89) (9.30) (16.52) 
         
Country dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) disturbances  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   135 135 135  154 154 154 
Adj. R-squared  0.85 0.84 0.85  0.79 0.79 0.79 
Rho   0.36 0.34 0.46  0.64 0.65 0.65 
                  
 
OLS regressions; unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; Prais-Winsten transformation.  
* Significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
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Table A4. Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the elderly (65+) with linearly inter- and extrapolated 
dependent and independent variables 
 
          
Income inequality (s80/s20) among the elderly (65+)  Poverty (PL 60) among the elderly (65+) 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  
  
             
 0.08    -0.06   Public pension expenditures (% 
GDP)  (0.07)    (0.48)   
         
 -0.34***    -0.03   Private pension expenditures 
(% GDP)  (0.12)    (0.77)   
         
  -5.31***    1.42  Private share (% total pension 
expenditures)   (1.64)    (12.04)  
         
   0.07    0.03 Total pension expenditures (% 
GDP)    (0.09)    (0.55) 
         
 -0.00 0.03 0.03  1.64*** 1.58*** 1.57*** Population aged 65 and over 
(% total)  (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)  (0.55) (0.48) (0.51) 
         
Constant  3.77*** 4.14*** 3.16*  -3.69 -3.53 -3.69 
  (1.46) (1.52) (1.83)  (6.74) (7.54) (7.64) 
         
Country dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) disturbances  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  195 195 195  195 195 195 
Adj. R-squared  0.75 0.76 0.75  0.72 0.71 0.71 
Rho   0.55 0.58 0.61  0.70 0.74 0.73 
           
 
OLS regressions; unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; Prais-Winsten transformation.  
* Significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
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Table A5. Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the elderly (65+) with linearly inter- and extrapolated 
independent variables 
 
          
Income inequality (s80/s20) among the elderly (65+)  Poverty (PL 60) among the elderly (65+) 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  
  
             
 0.18    -0.02   Public pension expenditures (% 
GDP)  (0.10    (0.58)   
         
 -0.25**    0.03   Private pension expenditures 
(% GDP)  (0.13    (0.72)   
         
  -5.20***    -1.70  Private share (% total pension 
expenditures)   (1.57)    (9.47)  
         
   0.07    0.00 Total pension expenditures (% 
GDP)    (0.09)    (0.52) 
         
 -0.01 0.04 0.05  1.68*** 1.67*** 1.66*** Population aged 65 and over 
(% total)  (0.12) (0.12) (.11)  (0.44) (0.36) (0.43) 
 
Constant 
 
2.76 3.97** 2.90  -4.75 -4.82 -4.66 
  (2.06) (.76) (2.03)  (5.85) (5.61) (5.90) 
         
Country dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) disturbances  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  189 189 189  189 189 189 
Adj. R-squared  0.76 0.76 0.75  0.72 0.71 0.71 
Rho   0.60 0.60 0.61  0.71 0.72 0.71 
           
 
OLS regressions; unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; Prais-Winsten transformation.  
* Significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
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Table A6. Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the elderly (65+) with linearly interpolated  
independent variables 
 
          
Income inequality (s80/s20) among the elderly (65+)  Poverty (PL 60) among the elderly (65+) 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  
  
             
 -0.09    -1.38   Public pension expenditures (% 
GDP)  (0.11)    (0.64)   
         
 -0.35***    -1.05   Private pension expenditures 
(% GDP)  (0.13)    (0.79)   
         
  -2.90**    -1.33  Private share (% total pension 
expenditures)   (1.44)    (10.64)  
         
   -0.16    -1.22** Total pension expenditures (% 
GDP)    (0.11)    (0.57) 
         
 -0.21** -0.21* -0.18*  -0.45 -0.63 -0.50 Population aged 65 and over 
(% total)  (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)  (0.57) (0.54) (0.56) 
         
Constant  8.43*** 7.47*** 8.50***  40.28*** 28.40*** 39.54*** 
  (1.91) (1.63) (1.94)  (.55) (8.35) 8.64 
         
Country dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) disturbances  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   164 164 164  169 169 169 
Adj. R-squared  0.83 0.83 0.83  0.75 0.73 0.74 
Rho   0.43 0.45 0.49  0.62 0.66 0.64 
           
 
OLS regressions; unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; Prais-Winsten transformation.  
* Significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
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Table A7. Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the elderly (65+) with cubically interpolated  
independent variables 
 
          
Income inequality (s80/s20) among the elderly (65+)  Poverty (PL 60) among the elderly (65+) 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  
  
             
 -0.09    -1.39**   Public pension expenditures (% 
GDP)  (0.11)    (0.64)   
         
 -0.33**    -1.02   Private pension expenditures 
(% GDP)  (0.14)    (0.78)   
         
  -2.73*    1.58  Private share (% total pension 
expenditures)   (1.47)    (10.51)  
         
   -0.15    -1.23** Total pension expenditures (% 
GDP)    (0.11)    (0.56) 
         
 -0.20** -0.21* -0.18*  -0.45 -0.64 -0.51 Population aged 65 and over 
(% total)  (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)  (0.52) (0.50) (0.52) 
         
Constant  8.37*** 7.43*** 8.46***  40.41*** 28.58*** 39.73*** 
  (1.97) (1.67) (2.00)  (8.02) (7.70) (8.09) 
         
Country dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) disturbances  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   164 164 164  168 168 168 
Adj. R-squared  0.83 0.82 0.82  0.75 0.74 0.75 
Rho   0.48 0.48 0.53  0.62 0.65 0.63 
           
 
OLS regressions; unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; Prais-Winsten transformation.  
* Significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
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Table A8. Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the elderly (65+) with cubically spline interpolated 
independent variables 
 
          
Income inequality (s80/s20) among the elderly (65+)  Poverty (PL 60) among the elderly (65+) 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  
  
             
 -0.09    -1.40*   Public pension expenditures (% 
GDP)  (0.11)    (0.73)   
         
 -0.32**    -1.02   Private pension expenditures 
(% GDP)  (0.14)    (0.85)   
         
  -2.67*    2.83  Private share (% total pension 
expenditures)   (1.48)    (12.21)  
         
   -0.15    -1.26* Total pension expenditures (% 
GDP)    (0.11)    (0.65) 
         
 -0.21* -0.21* -0.18*  -0.47 -0.69 -0.55 Population aged 65 and over 
(% total)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  (0.66) (0.64) (0.63) 
         
Constant  8.39*** 7.47*** 8.51***  40.95*** 29.09*** 40.45*** 
  (2.00) (1.71) (2.07)  (9.80) (9.80) (9.88) 
         
Country dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) disturbances  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  160 160 160  162 162 162 
Adj. R-squared  0.83 0.83 0.83  0.77 0.76 0.77 
Rho   0.49 0.49 0.54  0.64 0.67 0.65 
           
 
OLS regressions; unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; Prais-Winsten transformation.  
* Significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
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Table A9. Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the elderly (65+) excluding Scandinavian countries 
 
          
Income inequality (s80/s20) among the elderly (65+)  Poverty (PL 60) among the elderly (65+) 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  
  
             
 0.00    -1.58*   Public pension expenditures (% 
GDP)  (0.11)    (0.84)   
         
 -0.31**    -0.90   Private pension expenditures 
(% GDP)  (0.16)    (0.81)   
         
  -2.77*    7.10  Private share (% total pension 
expenditures)   (1.56)    (12.12)  
         
   -0.06    -1.30* Total pension expenditures (% 
GDP)    (0.11)    (0.69) 
         
 -0.24** -0.22** -0.21*  -0.94 -1.18 -1.06 Population aged 65 and over 
(% total)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  (0.75) (0.73) (0.74) 
         
Constant  7.96*** 7.70*** 8.00**  49.86*** 36.79*** 49.06*** 
  (1.81) (1.67) (1.85)  (11.40) (10.92) (11.46) 
         
Country dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) disturbances  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   112 112 112  123 123 123 
Adj. R-squared  0.85 0.86 0.86  0.79 0.78 0.79 
Rho   0.45 0.48 0.54  0.61 0.65 0.63 
           
 
OLS regressions; unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; Prais-Winsten transformation.  
* Significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
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Table A10. Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and different poverty lines (PL 50, PL 70) among the elderly (65+) 
 
          
Poverty (PL 50) among the elderly (65+)  Poverty (PL 70) among the elderly (65+) 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  
  
             
 -1.98***    -1.77**   Public pension expenditures (% 
GDP)  (0.59)    (0.86)   
         
 -1.88**    -1.40   Private pension expenditures 
(% GDP)  (0.92)    (1.19)   
         
Private share (% total pension 
expenditures) 
 
 -6.62    -5.35  
   (11.39)    (12.93)  
         
   -1.91***    -1.66** Total pension expenditures (% 
GDP)    (0.53)     
         
 -0.87* -1.16** -0.90*  0.18 -0.11 -0.12 Population aged 65 and over 
(% total)  (0.51) (0.47) (0.49)  (0.53) (0.51) (0.49) 
         
Constant  43.26*** 26.92*** 42.99***  44.08*** 30.05*** 43.90*** 
  (6.22) (7.16) (6.38)  (8.88) (7.93) (9.03) 
         
Country dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) disturbances  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   128 128 128  128 128 128 
Adj. R-squared  0.79 0.78 0.79  0.88 0.88 0.88 
Rho   0.42 0.38 0.43  0.60 0.59 0.60 
           
 
OLS regressions; unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; Prais-Winsten transformation.  
* Significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
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Table A11. Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and income inequality among the elderly (65+) using income distribution  
variables of OECD (2010) instead of Eurostat (2011) 
 
                
Gini before 
taxes and 
transfers 
Gini after 
taxes and 
transfers 
Standard coef-
ficient of va-
riation 
Mean log 
deviation  
Gini before 
taxes and 
transfers 
Gini after 
taxes and 
transfers 
Standard coeffi-
cient of variation 
Mean log 
deviation 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
  
                 
 
-0.09 -0.07*** -0.03 -0.13***  -0.10 -0.13*** -0.01*** -0.22*** Private share (% total 
pension expenditures)  (0.20) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.24) (0.04) (0.00) (0.07) 
           
Constant  0.76*** 0.32*** 1.83*** 0.20***  0.81*** 0.31*** 1.02*** 0.23*** 
  (0.08) (0.01) (1.40) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.20) (0.03) 
           
Country dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) disturbances  No No No No  No No No No 
Year restriction  No No No No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country restriction  No No No No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   85 108 96 96  37 45 42 42 
Adj. R-squared  0.72 0.95 0.45 0.97  0.88 0.93 0.79 0.89 
                     
 
OLS regressions; unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; Prais-Winsten transformation.  
* Significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.  
The coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by a factor of 100 in the columns (1), (2), (4), (5), (6) and (8). 
The full time span covers the years 1985 – 2005. The restricted period covers the years 1995 – 2005 to make the time span comparable to our main analyses based on the 
data from Eurostat (2011a). 
The full country group includes the 15 European countries and Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Slovak 
Republic, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States. The countries are restricted to the 15 European countries from the Eurostat (2011a) data set to make the analyses 
comparable. 
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Table A12. Panel data regressions of pension expenditures and social outcomes among the elderly (65+) using a decomposition of private 
pension expenditures into mandatory and voluntary expenditures 
 
              
Income inequality (s80/s20) among the elderly 
(65+)  Poverty (PL 60) among the elderly (65+) 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  
  
             
 -0.43*    -1.66   
Public pension expenditures (% GDP)  (0.23)    (2.08)   
         
 -0.37    -1.40   Mandatory pension expenditures 
(% GDP)  (0.30)    (2.50)   
         
 -0.76***    -0.66   Voluntary pension expenditures 
(% GDP)  (0.13)    (0.84)   
         
  -3.31** -7.55*   12.61 -1.83 Voluntary share (% total pension 
expenditures)   (1.39) (1.14)   (11.95) (10.23) 
         
   1.57    1.71 Mandatory share (% total pen-
sion expenditures)    (1.90)    (17.89) 
         
 0.17** -0.19* 0.18**  1.65 -0.84 1.45 Population aged 65 and over (% 
total)  (0.08) (0.11) (0.09)  (1.13) (0.75) (1.13) 
         
Constant  omitted 4.39* 1.30  10.02 30.99*** -6.74 
   (0.11) (1.70)  (29.26) (11.25) (21.34) 
         
Country dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) disturbances  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  49 135 49  60 154 60 
Adjusted R-squared  0.67 0.84 0.67  0.82 0.78 0.82 
Rho   -0.02 0.41 -0.04  0.44 0.65 0.46 
                  
 
OLS regressions; unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; Prais-Winsten transformation.  
* Significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.  
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